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A LTHOUGH the professional competency of lawyers is at its highest level,
a growing dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the discipline maintained
by bar associations is readily apparent in a survey conducted by one state
agency, which concluded that
a majority of lawyers are convinced that the public image of the pro-
fession is affected adversely by the policing procedure of the Canons
of Ethics and that policing is not adequately enforced.'
The public is losing faith in the profession and attorneys do not enjoy the
public trust they should be accorded in their critical position as guardians of
the people's rights.
2
In a recent case, Spevack v. Klein,3 a lawyer was subpoenaed to appear
before a New York judicial inquiry into his professional conduct, and to bring
with him certain records. The lawyer appeared before the investigating body,
but refused to testify or produce any documents, citing his privilege against
self-incrimination. He was disbarred for his failure to answer questions, under
the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cohen
v. Hurley4 The attorney argued that his disbarment denied him due process of
law in violation of the fourteenth amendment, because without any substantive
evidence of wrongdoing, it was a severe penalty for his mere failure to answer
questions put to him by the investigating body. The Supreme Court of the
United States explicitly overruled Cohen and reversed the state court's disbar-
* B.A. Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ. 1965; J.D. University of Detroit
Law School, 1968.
1. See Lawyers Practice Manual, Missouri Bar-Prentice Hall Survey 16 (1964).
2. Dodd v. The Florida Bar, 118 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1960). See justice Terrell's con-
curring opinion wherein he remarked: "This and other courts have many times called
attention to the fact that one practices law by grace and not by right, that the practice of
law is affected wih a public interest and that the privilege to practice may be withdrawn
from one when wilful disregard of the honor of the profession is shown. It is common
knowledge that many lawyers personally enjoy public esteem and confidence, but as a
profession the public is skeptical of us and we do not enjoy the measure of public confidence
we should." 118 So. 2d at 20 (emphasis added). In a most historical perspective
Montaigne once declared that an attorney should state his final proposition first. Judge
Warren E. Burger of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
describing the state of the legal profession, commented on Montaigne's statement and
posited the following proposition: "(1) the legal profession as a whole has very poor stand-
ing; (2) there are many causes for this; some of them incompetence, misconduct, bad
manners and lack of training of a great many lawyers who appear in the courts; and
(3) there is something we can and ought to do about this as the English bar and bench did
a century ago.' See Burger, A Sick Profession, 5 Tulsa L.J. 1 (1968).
3. 16 N.Y.2d 1048, 213 N.E.2d 457, 266 N.Y.S.2d (1965); 17 N.Y.2d 490, 214 N.E.2d
373, 267 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1966).
4. 366 U.S. 117 (1961). See text following infra note 65.
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ment order. 5 The Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was absorbed into the fourteenth amendment and extended to
state disbarment and disciplinary actions against attorneys. To arrive at this
result the four justices who dissented in CohenO needed the addition of Mr.
Justice Fortas to the bench to establish a majority. Added to this was the
majority's equating of a "criminal case" with a case involving a "penalty" not
restricted to a fine or imprisonment, but involving the imposition of any sanction
that made the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination "costly."1
7
The plurality opinion held essentially that since the fifth amendment was
binding on the states8 the penalty of disbarment for invoking the privilege
constituted a violation of due process. Justice Douglas declared that:
The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, profes-
sional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion
to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege. ... We find no room in the
privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so as
to deny it to some and extend it to others. . . . [L] awyers also enjoy
first-class citizenship.9
Justice Fortas filed a concurring opinion in which he distinguished Spevack
from Garrity v. New Jersey,'° decided by the Court on the same day. In
Garrity, two policemen testified in an official inquiry because they would have
been discharged had they asserted the privilege against self-incrimination and
refused to testify. The Court in Garrity held that the statements obtained from
public employees following a threat of discharge for refusal to answer could not
be admitted as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution of such employees,
on the ground that such procedure violated the fifth amendment." Justice
Fortas indicated that he could have voted to affirm the attorney's disbarment if
the case had presented the question of whether a lawyer could be disbarred
for refusing to keep or produce, upon properly authorized demand, records
which the lawyer was required by the state to keep as part of his duties.12 He
distinguished the two cases on the grounds that as between attorneys and
public employees, the latter has a greater responsibility to the state. The
public employee, as distinguished from an attorney, is an agent of the state.
5. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
6. These were Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Chief Justice Warren.
7. See 385 U.S. 511 at 515 citing Griflin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) where the
Court had said that the fifth amendment operating through the fourteenth amendment
"forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the
Court that such silence is evidence of guilt." 380 U.S. at 615.
8. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
9. 385 U.S. 511 at 516.
10. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
11. The opinion by Justice Douglas cited Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Service Comm'n,
248 U.S. 67 (1918) where a certificate exacted under protest and in violation of the com-
merce clause was held invalid. Justice Douglas said in Garrity: "Where the choice is
'between the rock and the whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the
other." 385 U.S. at 498.
12. 385 U.S. 511 at 520 (concurring opinion, Fortas, J.).
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As such, he has a duty to account to the state for his actions. The attorney,
on the other hand, has merely the duty to obey the rules of conduct laid down
as part of the state's licensing procedures. The special responsibilities of the
attorney do not, however, deny to the attorney the availability of fifth amend-
ment privileges.' 3
The significance of this opinion is in its narrow view of the professional
responsibility of the bar and its members. It seems to reject any notion of an
attorney's higher duty in the protection of individual rights, and it places
perhaps too great a confidence in the state bar agency's interest in the integrity
of its members.' 4
Four justices dissented in Spevack' 5 and the thrust of their argument is
excellently described in the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan who said:
What is done today will be disheartening and frustrating to courts and
bar associations throughout the country in their efforts to maintain
high standards at the bar .... [S]till more pervasively, this decision
can hardly fail to encourage oncoming generations of lawyers to think
of their calling as imposing on them no higher standards of behavior
than might be acceptable in the general market place. The soundness
of a constitutional doctrine carrying such denigrating import for our
profession is surely suspect on its face.16
Justice White contended that the Garrity rule precluding the use of coerced
testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings would similarly protect testimony
elicited during disbarment proceedings. With the protection thus extended to
statements made by an attorney in a disbarment proceeding, Justice White
argued that the fifth amendment privilege should not be available to an attorney
who would thwart the attempted purposes of the proceeding by refusing to
communicate information relating to the performance of his public duty.17
Although Spevack, if narrowed to its precise holding, does not portend
trouble, the expansion of its "fringes ' 'ls which has already begun' 9 may create
numerous problems for bar associations. The reaction to Spevack was mixed,2 0
but one of the most distressing statements was made by Maurice Cathey, Presi-
dent of the Arkansas Bar Association:
There are those within our profession who would applaud the present
course of judicial decision, which gives primary emphasis, maximum
13. Id. at 519-20.
14. See Franck, The Myth of Spevack v. Klein, 54 A.B.A.J. 970, 971 (1968).
15. Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart and White.
16. 385 U.S. 511, at 520-21 (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.).
17. 385 U.S. 511, at 531 (dissenting opinion, White, J.).
18. See Franck, supra note 14 at 974.
19. The problem as to whether disbarment proceedings come within the meaning of
the "criminal case" provision of the fifth amendment was recently decided in In Re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544 (1968) where Justice Douglas obtained a nearly unanimous decision holding
that disciplinary proceedings are of a "quasi-criminal nature."
20. Cf. Givens, Reconciling the Fifth Amendment with the Need for more Effective
Law Enforcement, 52 A.B.A.J. 443 (1966); Niles & Kaye, Spevack v. Klein: Milestone or
Millstone in Bar Discipline? 53 A.BAJ. 1121 (1967).
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benefit and almost complete protection to the privileges which the
lawyer can enjoy in acquiring and retaining the rewards which go
-with his license to practice law....
I hope that the organized bar will never say that, when a lawyer's
professional conduct and competency be challenged, the legal profession
need seek only constitutional parity with Escabedo, Miranda and the
other famed names of our decade....
[A]s lawyers we must place both our standards and our obliga-
tions above those of the tradesman in the market-place and the ac-
cused in a criminal prosecution.
Law and the practice of law have been good to all of us. Our
prospects are bright if we do not let our demands for rights and
privileges eclipse our concepts as to our responsibilities.
In exchange for the privileges which have been granted to us as
members of the legal profession, we owe to the administration of justice
a great something in return.
With centuries of tradition and history behind us, the final worth
of the legal profession is yet to be measured. This true measure will
be found not in how eloquently we speak, how high we climb, or how
fast we run. The true measure will be found in how tall we stand when
we bear our burdens.21
Focusing upon the problems in the area of disbarment, this article will
attempt to delineate the privilege against self-incrimination as applied to various
proceedings. The conceptual framework of the privilege will be analyzed most
specifically in state disbarment proceedings after a presentation of the historical
antecedents of the fifth amendment privilege. An attempt will be made to
effectively reconstruct the rationale which led to Spevack and present the
problems which may develop out of this decision and the importance of re-
flection by the bar and the courts of its impact in state disbarment procedures.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The historical roots of the privilege against self-incrimination as embodied
in the fifth amendment to the constitution are to be found in the resistance of
Englishmen to the so-called oath ex officio of the eccelesiastical courts. The
purpose of these investigations was to unveil suspected violators of church canon
or custom, or to exposit the truth of either vague or definite charges not dis-
closed to the person questioned.22
The maxim "Nemo tenetur prodere (or accusare) seipsum"C--"nobody is
bound to accuse himself,"2 first came into general notice as a result of the
21. See Cathey, The Fifth Amendment-Its Protection of the Right to Become and
Remain a Lawyer, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 361, 366-7 (1967).
22. See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1949).
23. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 71, 87 (1891). For an
historical analysis of the American conceptualization of this maxim, see Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896). The Court there said: "The Maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare
had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of inter-
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protest against characteristic procedures of the English Law, such as the
practice of the Star Chamber around 1487 ;24 and the initial occasion for its
appearance was the controversy which developed near the end of the 16th
century between common law courts and the Court of High Commission.2 5 In
1589 the issue was raised in the Common Pleas in Collier v. Collier26 where
Lord Coke as counsel for the petitioners sought, and according to two of the
accountS27 obtained a Writ prohibiting the spiritual courts from examining
them on charges of incontenency. Although a later decision held to the contrary, s
in 1607 when Coke had been elevated to the position of Chief Justice of the
Common Pleas, he enunciated the doctrine that the oath could not be exacted
regarding any matter punishable at common law.
In an answer propounded by Coke and Popham, Chief Justice of the
King's Bench, they declared that:
it standeth not with the right order of justice nor good equity that any
person should be convicted and put to the loss of his life, good name,
or goods, unless it were by due accusation, and witnesses, or by pre-
sentment, verdict, confession, or process, or outlawry.29
In light of Coke's advocacy and later judicial recognition of the rationale
that no man should accuse himself, the ultimate fruition of the maxim occurred
rogating accused persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and....
[were] not uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner,
when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating
evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime
under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial
character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or
reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is
so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, . . .made the system so odious as
to give rise to a demand for its total abolition .... So deeply did the iniquities of the
ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states,
with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their
fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became
clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment." 161 U.S. at
596-97.
24. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 4, n.12 where Baldwin in an historical account
indicates that the accused in criminal cases before the King's Council had to appear in
person, without counsel, and to "answer the charges which were most likely not known to
him in advance . . .If he did not immediately confess or satisfactorily explain the charges,
he was put to the method known as the interrogatory examination. This was an acknowl-
edged feature of the civil and criminal law which in its extreme form was pursued by the
church especially but not exclusively in heresy trials. It was a method that was creeping
into secular practice, in the courts of the kings bench and common pleas, as early as the
reign of Edward I ... As practically administered the examinations were of several degrees,
according to the nature of the case and the advancement of the art of questioning."
25. See H. G. Hanbury, English Courts of Law, (4th ed. 1967); M. Hastings, The
Court of Common Pleas in Fifteenth Century England (1947).
26. 4 Leon 194; Cro. El. 201; Moor 906.
27. See Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination; Its History, 15 Harv. L.
Rev. 610, 620 n.4 (1902).
28. Doctor Hunt's Case, Cro. El. 262 (1591).
29. 12 Rep. 26-29. To the same effect, see Corwin, Supreme Court's Construction of,
the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1930).
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in the trial of John Lilburne before the court of the Star Chamber in 1637.80
Lilburne refused to answer questions concerning matters as to which there had
been no accusation against him.31 The penalty imposed was a whipping, which
took place in 1638. Three years later Parliament declared the action illegal and
most unjust, against the liberty of the subject and the law of the land, and
Magna Carta.32 Some months later he was ordered a 3,000 pound reparation
for the punishment he had suffered.83 Shortly thereafter in 1641, the Court of
the BHigh Commission and Court of the Star Chamber were abolished by
statute.
34
The total impact of this decision is expressed by Professor Corwin in these
terms:
Liburne's trial, together with this aftermath, has, therefore, a two-fold
bearing upon the development of the modern doctrine against self-
incrimination: first, in the wide advertisement which it afforded the
maxim as a constituent element of "law of land," deemed to have been
consecrated by Magna Charta; and secondly, in substantially obliter-
ating the distinction which had existed, certainly in Coke's mind,
between the status in relation to the maxim of a regularly accused
defendant and that of other persons.
From this time forth judicial recognition and development of the
maxim proceeded with great rapidity, so much so indeed that long
before the Constitution of the United States was adopted, or even
before American independence was thought of, the privilege against
self-incrimination had received an extension in the English cases which
in some respects is broader than its application by the United States
Supreme Court today.3 5
Although some legal historians have argued that that privilege remained
an unknown doctrine for a whole generation and was "unrecognized" until at
least as late as 1685,36 the great weight of authority has presented evidence
that the privilege had become conceptualized in the New England colonies in
the language of the Body of Liberties enacted in 1641.
37
The early American colonists objected to the inquisitorial methods used
30. 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1640).
31. Lilburne argued that if "'he had been proceeded against by a bill' . . . he would
have responded, that is to say, as a witness concerning the conduct of others he was
protected from incriminating himself, although had he been regularly accused he would have
had to testify." (Found in Corwin, supra note 29 at p. 8).
32. 3 How. St. Tr. 1342 (1640).
33. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
34. Statutes of the Realm, 110-13.
35. Corwin, supra note 29 at p. 9.
36. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
37. See Bradford, History of the Plymouth Plantation, Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. Ser. 4
Vol. 3 pp. 390-91. See also, Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763, 775 n.34 (1935).
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by royal governors and their counsel, and protection was. afforded within
Liberty No. 45 which read in part:
No man shall be forced by torture to confess any crime against himself
nor any other unlesse it be in some capital case where he is first fullie
convicted by clear and sufficient evidence to be guilty . . .38
It was the condemnation of torture and the negation of infamy as a
sanction that brought the fifth amendment into the Constitution. 9 There is
little question that it was the founding fathers' desire to remedy the evil of
exacting confessions by the use of torture40 which resulted in the formation of
the third clause of the fifth amendment which reads "no person .... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
41
Justice Douglas has said that the fifth amendment
was written in part to prevent any Congress, any court, and any
prosecutor from prying open the lips of an accused to make incrimina-
ting statements against his will. The Fifth Amendments protects the
conscience and the dignity of the individual, as well as his safety and
security, against the compulsion of government.
42
Dean Griswold has recently remarked that:
Where matters of a man's belief or opinions or political views are
essential elements in the charge, it is most difficult to get evidence
from sources other than the suspected or accused person himself.
Hence, the significance of the privilege over the years has perhaps
been greatest in connection with resistance to prosecution for such
offenses as heresy or political crimes. In these areas the privilege against
self-incrimination has been a protection for freedom of thought and a
hindrance to any government which might wish to prosecute for
thoughts and opinions alone.43
Thus succeeding generations of judicial minds have recognized the privilege
to be an important as well as difficult one to apply in various factual circum-
stances. Still, it is regarded as one of the most important concepts and safeguards
within American criminal jurisprudence, 44 as evidence in part by the fact that
the constitutions of all but two of the states contain provisions similar to those
embodied within the United States Constitution.45
38. Whittmore, Col. Laws of Mass. pp. 32-61. Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. Ser. 3 Vol. 8
p. 2247.
39. See Ulman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 447-48 (1956).
40. See e.g., Virginia Debates, 2d ed. 1805, 221, 320-21; 2 Elliot's Debates 111 (2d ed.
1876). Cited in Ullman v. United States, supra note 39 at 448.
41. United States Constitution, Amendment V.
42. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,449 (1956) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.).
43. See Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today, 8-9 (1955).
44. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
45. In these two states, Iowa and New Jersey, it has been adopted by case law. See
8 Wigmore, Evidence 319-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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III. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS IN DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
A. Early Supreme Court Decisions
During medieval England, the Inns of Court, judges and Parliament super-
vised the admission and discipline of attorneys.46 In England no one could
become a barrister without the consent and approval of the Inns of Court and
no reason had to be given for the Inns' failure to approve or discipline a member
of the legal profession. The only remedy was by appeal to the twelve judges
in their capacity as visitors of the Inns of Court. Towards the end of the middle
ages a well organized profession had developed in England.
47
During the period of colonization this characterization of the profession
as "organized" was not favored by the legal profession itself, but through ex-
perience it was recognized that the necessity of a professional organization would
be the only means of survival from corruption and immorality within the
profession.4 8 Supervision of the profession and the practice of law was accom-
plished through the dual acquiescence of both the legislature and the courts.
At an early date it was acknowledged that the judicial branch should exercise
control of the state bar and comparable agencies having jurisdiction over ad-
missions standards and disciplinary proceedings. It was also decided that such
activities were fundamentally a state function and therefore best left to the
discretion of the states, rather than to federal agencies.
The Supreme Court of the United States was faced with this problem in
Ex Parte Burr,49 a case which involved the removal and suspension of an
attorney from the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. Chief Justice
Marshall indicated that the Supreme Court would not interfere with a state
court's decision concerning disbarment unless it was grossly irregular and
unjust. In denying the petitioner's motion to be restored to his position as an
attorney, Justice Marshall indicated that the judiciary ought to be given some
discretion in controlling the procedures of the bar, in order to protect not only
the attorney's exercise of his professional duties and responsibilities, but the
respectability of the bar itself.50
Addressing itself to the same problem at a later date, the Supreme Court
in Ex Parte Secombe5' decided that the determination of qualifications for
becoming an attorney and counsellor and causes for removal rested exclusively
with the judicial branch. The Court there said that
the relations between the court and the attorneys and counsellors who
practice in it, and their respective rights and duties, are regulated by
the common law. And it has been well settled, by the rules and practice
46. Pound, The Lawyers From Antiquity to Modern Times 100 (1953).
47. Id. at 93.
48. Id. at XXVIII. See Note, State Versus Federal Jurisdiction and Control Over
Admisslon and Discipline of Attorneys, 64 W. Va. L. Rev. 70, 71 (1961).
49. 9 Wheat. 529 (1824).
50. Id. at 530.
51. 19 How. 9 (1856).
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of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to
determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney
and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed. 52
Chief Justice Taney emphasized that this power had limitations and indi-
cated the importance of the court exercising its discretion in a manner which
would not impinge on the rights and the independence of the bar. 53 This posi-
tion was reaffirmed in Ex Parte Garland54 where the principal issue and holding
dealt with an enactment by Congress prescribing, as a qualification for the
admission as attorney and counsellor in the Supreme Court, a test oath by
deponents that they had never voluntarily borne arms against the United States.
The Court held the statue void, declaring that:
The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties
possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and
are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein .... Their
admission or exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power.
It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous
cases.5
5
In Randall v. Brigham,5 6 involving malpractice proceedings against an
attorney, the authority of the courts in this area was reiterated. In analyzing
the court's role in this respect, Justice Field reasoned that the special responsi-
bilities of attorneys as officers of the court and counsellors of private clients
demand that they be endowed with ability of a high order and the strictest
integrity. It is the role of a judiciary to assure that these qualities adhere in
members of the legal profession.
57
The most significant aspect of this decision was the statement of guidelines
and standards with respect to the procedures in disciplinary proceedings. The
Court's opinion declared:
It is not necessary that proceedings against attorneys for malpractice,
or any unprofessional conduct, should be founded upon formal allega-
tions against them. Such proceedings are often instituted upon informa-
tion developed in the progress of a cause; or from what the court learns
of the conduct of the attorney from his own observation. Sometimes
they are moved by third parties upon affidavit; and sometimes they
are taken by the court upon its own motion. All that is requisite to
their validity is that, when not taken for matters occurring in open
court, in the presence of the judges, notice should be given to the
attorney, of the charges made and opportunity afforded him for ex-
planation and defense. The manner in which the proceeding shall be
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id.
54. 4 Wall. 333 (1865).
55. Id. at 378-79.
56. 7 Wall. 523 (1868).
57. Id. at 540.
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conducted, so that it be without oppression or unfairness, is a matter
of judicial regulationP
8
This early development of informal disciplinary proceedings for attorneys,
regulated solely by the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion, resulted
primarily from the lack of general limitations circumscribing the powers of
the state against aggrieved individuals.r9 Because the Bill of Rights, prior to
1868, was applicable only to the national government, attorneys were not
afforded constitutional protection of their rights in such discretionary proceed-
ings. When the fourteenth amendment became welded into the case law, a
significant trend developed toward protecting individual liberties from encroach-
ment by the states. 0
B. Change in the Philosophy of the Court Regarding Privilege
and its Application to Disbarment Cases
The Supreme Court in 1957 decided in Schware v. Board of Bar Exam-
iners6 ' and Konigsberg v. State Bar6 2 that state bar admission standards or
procedures, if they negated constitutional rights, would be violative of due
process.
In Schware, the petitioner's exclusion from the bar had been based upon
his admitted membership in the Communist Party from 1932 to 1940. His
application also revealed that he had used certain aliases while working at the
docks between 1933 and 1937. He had been arrested on "suspicion of criminal
syndicalism" in violation of a state statute even though he was never formally
charged. He was also arrested and indicted for violating the Neutrality Act of
1917. The charges were all dismissed and he was released on all occasions.
The New Mexico Board of Examiners reviewed the evidence and after a formal
hearing denied the petitioner an application for admission to the bar examina-
tion on the grounds that he did not have the requisite "good moral character"
as required by statute. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the Board's
decision. The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Justice
Black, reversed the state court ruling and concluded that Schware's past mem-
bership was not sufficient to warrant an inference of bad character and that
there was no rational evidence which made him morally unqualified to take the
bar examination. Consequently, the Court held that Schware had been denied
due process. 3 Justice Frankfurter, with Justices Clark and Harlan, concurred
on the ground that the state court was unwarranted in concluding that peti-
58. Id.
59. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833).
60. See Dowling, Constitutional Law 599 (6th ed. 1959).
61. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
62. Id. at 252.
63. Id. at 246-47.
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tioner's past communist affiliation made him "a person of questionable
character." 64
In the Konigsberg case the Court was faced with a much more complex
situation. The California State Committee of Bar Examiners refused to certify
the applicant for admission on the grounds that he had refused to answer
questions as to his present and past membership in the Communist party.
Konigsberg contended that this action violated his first amendment freedoms
and that a state could not inquire into his political opinions and associations.
The Committee based its refusal of certification on the fact that the petitioner
had failed to prove that he was of good moral character 65 and that he did not
advocate the violent overthrow of the government. The Supreme Court held
that the committee's denial violated due process; basing its decision on the fact
that .the evidence available upon which to judge Konigsberg's qualifications
was arbitrary and unreasonable.66 The Court's propensity to freely overrule
the state court determinations upon a showing of unreasonableness caused
Justice Harlan to warn that the Court might have gone beyond the limits of
judicial authority, acting "instead as if it were a super sate court of appeals."
67
The rationale exposited by the majority of the Court continued for only
four years. In 1961, the Court virtually reversed itself. In three 5-4 decisions
the Court held that the states could constitutionally condition the opportunity
to practice law on the cooperation displayed by an applicant in answering
questions and revealing pertinent information when examined by bar admission
committees as well as judicial inquiries into a practicing attorney's professional
ethics.
The first case, Konigsberg v. State Bar68 was before the Court a second
time. Konigsberg I had been remanded by the Court and the applicant had
again refused to answer the committee's questions. The California State Bar
again denied Konigsberg an application on the grounds that his refusal ob-
structed a full investigation of his qualifications. The California Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling.69 In Konigsberg II, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the State Bar's action, 70 relying on Beilan v. Board of Education71
which had held that a state could, without violating due process, dismiss a
teacher who refused to answer his employer's questions regarding subversive
activities. The one limitation the Court did impose was that the questions
64. Id. at 250-51 (concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J., and Clark, and Harlan, JJ.).
65. For an excellent discussion of the difficulty in determining and proving "good moral
character" on the part of both the applicant and the Committee, see Starrs, Consideration
on Determination of Good Moral Character, 18 U. Det. LJ. 195 (1956).
66. 353 U.S. at 262.
67. Id. at 277 (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.).
68. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
69. 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P.2d 777 (1961).
70. For a clear indication of the reasons for the Committee's decision see 366 U.S. at
39 nn.2-3.
71. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
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asked by the appropriate agency had to be reasonably connected with the prac-
tice of law.
72
In re Anastaplo78 was similar to Konigsberg, except that there was no
evidence linking the applicant to the Communist Party. In affirming the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in denying Anastaplo admission to the bar, the Court
relied on the rationale of Konigsberg II and held that a prospective attorney
violates his duty to the bar examiners when he bases his refusal to answer upon
an unavailable constitutional privilege.74 The weakness of Anastaplo is that the
Court did not articulate any guidelines which would identify situations, if any,
that would prove the noncooperation ground a sham.75
The third case, Cohen v. Hurley,76 involved a judicial investigation relating
to alleged professional misconduct on the part of the petitioner. Relying on his
privilege against self-incrimination, he refused to answer material questions.
A disbarment was filed against the petitioner on the ground that he deliberately
refused to cooperate with the court in its efforts to expose certain unethical
practices. In rejecting the petitioner's claim that the disbarment was violative
of due process, the Supreme Court affirmed the state court's action. Justice
Harlan, in his opinion for the majority, reasoned that the state has through
history rightfully assumed a substantial interest in conducting investigations
and in disciplining members of the bar, in order to maintain the highest
standards of professional conduct in its attorneys.77 Accordingly, the manner
of performing this disciplinary function should be entirely within the discretion
of the particular state and its courts.
The Court reasoned that since an order of disbarment is distinctly differ-
ent from a penal sanction for misconduct, the state is to be given a wide
latitude with respect to constitutional requirements in conducting disciplinary
investigations. 78 The primary support for this rationale was derived from the
theory that a state's interest in maintaining the integrity and reputation of
the bar required procedures resulting in the certainty of prevention of mis-
conduct among its members.79
As to the contention that the majority opinion separated attorneys into a
"special group" with "special burdens," Justice Harlan retorted that:
This argument wholly misconceives the issue and what the Court has
held respecting it. The issue is not, of course, whether lawyers are en-
titled to due process of law in matters of this kind, but, rather, what
process is constitutionally due them in such circumstances. We do not
hold that lawyers, because of their special status in society, can there-
72. 366 U.S. at 52-53.
73. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
74. Id. at 89.
75. Id. at 97.
76. 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
77. Id. at 123-24.
78. Id. at 126.
79. Id. at 127.
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fore be deprived of constitutional rights assured to others, but only,
as in all cases of this kind, that what procedures are fair, what state
process is constitutionally due, what distinctions are consistent with
the right to equal protection, all depend upon the particular situation
presented, and that history is surely relevant to these inquiries.80
Mr. Justice Black's dissent criticized the indiscriminate use of history in
determining whether due process was accorded the petitioner. His criticism was
based primarily on the ostensible desire of the founding fathers to prevent well-
known historical injustices, including those caused by disciplinary methods
against attorneys.81 Justice Black, in addressing himself to the factual evidence
presented by the record,82 argued that due process and equal protection were
being violated. He believed that the petitioner's disbarment would result in
financial loss, destruction of reputation, and would bring familial suffering not
consonant with his past record as an attorney. Justice Black reasoned that the
nature of disbarment is indeed a strong penalty, and that membership in the
bar is not merely a privilege, conferred by the state, to be withdrawn for "the
'breach' of whatever vague and indefinite 'duties' the courts and other lawyers
may see fit to impose on a case-by-case basis."83
In a separate dissent Mr. Justice Douglas maintained that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause obligated the states to accord the full sweep
of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to one who invokes
it. Moreover, he declared that even "apart from the Fifth Amendment ...a
State may [not] require self-immolation as a condition of retaining the license
of an attorney.1
8 4
Justice Brennan's dissent gave support to this argument by reason of the
long line of cases which had incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
various safeguards contained in the Bill of Rights. Thus, Brennan concluded
that:
the full sweep of the Fifth Amendment privilege ha-% been absorbed in
the Fourteenth Amendment. In that view the protection it affords the
individual, lawyer or not, against the State, has the same scope as that
against the National Government .... 5
80. Id. at 129-30.
81. justice Black cited the famous trial of John Peter Zenger who had been a news-
paper publisher who had criticized the government and was charged with seditious libel.
366 U.S. at 140 n.18.
82. Black criticized the majority for not confining conflicts over professional ethics to
those "ordinary and investigatory and prosecutorial processes," adding that the record
indicated that "[a man who has devoted thirty-nine years of his life to the practice of
law and who, so far as this record shows, has never failed to perform those services faith-
fully and honorably is being dismissed from the profession in disgrace and is having his
means of livelihood taken away from him at a point in his life when it seems highly un-
likely that he will be able to find an adequate alternative means to support himself." 366
U.S. at 148.
83. Id. at 147.
84. 366 U.S. 117, 153 (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.).
85. 366 U.S. 117, 160 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.).
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This forceful minority became the majority in 1967, in Spevack v. Klein,80
where the rationale that an attorney's disbarment may be predicated on his
assertion of the privilege was expressly rejected. A number of reasons for this
reversal can be stated. Initially, the addition of Mr. Justice Fortas to the
Supreme Court commanded a majority. Secondly, three years after Cohen, in
Malloy v. Hogan"7 the Court held: (a) that the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment was applicable to state criminal proceedings via the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment; (b) that the person claiming the privilege
could not be made to suffer a "penalty" for remaining silent in reliance on the
privilege; and (c) that the same guidelines must be used at both the state and
federal levels of government whenever an individual relies upon the fifth
amendment.
The federal standard ennunciated and made applicable to the states as a
result of Malloy was that the judge must believe that, from all the circumstances
and the nature of the evidence sought, the answer could possibly have a tendency
to incriminate the witness.88 The state standard which was rejected had been
that if the judge determined that there was some reasonable ground to appre-
hend danger to the witness were he compelled to answer, then the question was
incriminating.8 9
The Malloy decision expanded the types of questions which were considered
incriminating whereas in many state courts the limitation had been only as to
those questions concerned with the essential facts of a crime or those facts which
might assist in establishing a case against the witness.90 Whether Malloy was an
imposition of a federal standard that would negate state experimentation in the
area of criminal procedure has only recently manifested itself.9 1 The Malloy
decision, although not expressly overruling Cohen did recognize that the principle
upon which the latter decision was based had been seriously erodedY
2
When the Court was faced with Spevack, which was substantially on all
86. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
87. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Petitioner, as a witness in a state inquiry into gambling and
other crimes, invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, refusing to answer a number
of questions related to events surrounding his previous arrest during a gambling raid and
his conviction of pool selling. The Connecticut Superior Court adjudged him in contempt
and committed him to prison until he was willing to answer. His application for habeas
corpus was denied by the Superior Court, and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
affirmed, holding that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination was not
available to a witness in a state proceeding, that the fourteenth amendment extended no
privilege to him, and that he had not properly invoked the privilege available under the
Connecticut Constitution. 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744.
88. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
89. The test was first enunciated in The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330, 121 Eng.
Rep. 730, 738 (Q.B. 1861) and was followed in Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362,
365 (1917).
90. See Note, Constitutional Law, 37 Colo. L. Rev. 157, 158 n.10 (1964).
91. See the concurring opinion of Justice Fortas in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211
(1968) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) where he indicates that such an
imposition is without authority and there is no necessity for such a doctrine.
92. 378 U.S. at 11.
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fours with Cohen, they had to either affirm Spevack's disbarment or to overrule
Cohen. The Court chose the latter course primarily because of the implications
of Malloy. The dissent in Spevack did state that Malloy simply stood for the
proposition that the fifth amendment was applicable to state hearings, but
that failure to "provide information relevant to charges of misconduct . . .
vitiated the protection afforded by the privilege" and permitted disbarment.93
The difficulty in rationalizing the Spevack holding can be mitigated by an
analysis of the methodology used by the Court in the pre-Malloy decisions, that
of balancing the respective interests, as compared with the post-Malloy philos-
ophy of "incorporating" certain rights contained in the first eight amendments
"whole."94
Until Spevack the privilege against self-incrimination as applied to at-
torneys in disbarment proceedings was a superficial employment of the constitu-
tional guarantee.9 5 The utilization of the balancing test in the Konigsberg,
Sclavare, Anastaplo, and Cohen cases was determined to be violative of due
process after Malloy. In Malloy the fifth amendment had been "incorporated"
because it was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."9 6 But for whom,
to what degree, and in what circumstances?
The answer to these questions is also the third reason for the Spevack
holding. At the same time that Cohen and Malloy were being decided, the
Court's trend in finding constitutional the dismissals of teachers and public
employees who claimed their privilege against self-incrimination before depart-
mental proceedings and legislative hearings97 was clearly apparent.
In Adler v. Board of Education9" the Supreme Court had upheld New
York's "Feinberg Law"99 which provided for the dismissal of teachers who were
93. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 520, 522 (1967) (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.).
94. For a criticism and the logical inconsistency that developed as a result of the
theory of "incorporation" and the method by which the federal standard was made
applicable see Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" In the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 Yale
L.J. 74, 81-82 n.28 (1963). Also Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929, 935-36 (1965) where the author suggests that the incorpora-
tion doctrine is only viable if one accepts that judicial subjectivity is the explanation for
making certain "specifics" applicable as opposed to total incorporation as argued for by
Justice Black in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion,
Black, J.).
95. This concept had first been stated by Justice Brennan in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.). Later in Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) involving confrontation of witnesses Justice Goldberg argued that
because the safeguards of the Bill of Rights was so essential to liberty the federal standard
should be made applicable. 380 U.S. 410, at 413 (concurring opinion, Goldberg, J.).
96. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
97. See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968);
Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967).
98. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
99. N.Y. Educ. L. § 3022(2) states in part that "membership in any such organization
included in such listing . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence of disqualification for
appointment to or retention in any office or position in the public schools of the state . . ."
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members of certain subversive organizations. There the teachers were permitted
to explain their reasons for failure to testify at the initial administrative hearing.
Subsequently, in Slochower v. Board of Education'00 the Court held that a dis-
missal of a Brooklyn College professor who had claimed his privilege was
unconstitutional. The court indicated that Sloclower was not necessarily entitled
to his job, but should have been given the opportunity to explain his reason for
refusing to answer the legally authorized inquiries into his official conduct as was
done in Adler. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, contended that an equa-
tion of guilt with the exercise of the privilege would reduce the right "to a
hollow mockery."'' 01
In 1958, in Beilan v. Board of Education,10 2 Justice Clark cast his vote
with the majority, and the Court upheld the dismissal of a teacher in Pennsyl-
vania who refused to answer questions regarding his political associations, after
a warning that failure to answer might lead to dismissal. Justice Burton's opin-
ion noted that an employee working in a sensitive position has the obligation
of answering questions put to him with frankness, candor, and the cooperation
when such inquiry involves his fitness to teach. Citing Adler, the majority
opinion in Beilan opened:
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes
the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live.
In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity
of the schools. That the school authorities have the right and the
duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness
to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society,
cannot be doubted.
0
Since these cases, decided before Malloy, the Court's philosophy has under-
gone a complete change. This was reflected in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
0 4
decided after Garrity and Spevack. In the Keyishian case, a number of faculty
members of the State University of New York brought an action for declaratory
judgment that a New York law' 0 5 which required teachers to sign a loyalty oath
was unconstitutional. In holding the statute violative of due process, the Su-
preme Court of the United States cited Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners'"0
and stated that "mere [communist] Party membership, even with the knowledge
of the Party's unlawful goals, cannot suffice to justify criminal punishment ...
nor may it warrant a finding of moral unfitness justifying disbarment."10 7 Al-
See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and text following infra note 104
where the Court declared this statute to be unconstitutionally vague.
100. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
101. Id. at 557.
102. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
103. Id. at 405.
104. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
105. N.Y. Educ. L. § 3021-22.
106. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
107. 385 U.S. at 607.
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though Keyishian did not involve the privilege against self-incrimination, the
broad language of the Court seems to absorb this constitutional safeguard as
well, declaring that the constitution rejects the proposition that "public employ-
ment, including academic employment, may be conditioned upon the surrender
of constitutional rights which c6uld not be abridged by direct government
action." 10 8
An examination of these decisions indicates the alternatives that faced the
Spevack Court.1 9 It could have extended the Beilan duty rule, by analogy, to
the attorney-Bar relationship. It could have extended Malloy, leaving public
employees as a group to be covered in subsequent decisions. Finally, it could
have restricted the Beilan rule, *making it applicable only to public employees,
and narrowing the Malloy rule.
The plurality opinion in Spevack chose the second alternative, although it
indicated that this was not their intention." 0 Justice Fortas' opinion seems to
follow the third alternative."' The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements
dealing with government employees and public officials supports this position
and are a persuasive indication that the Court has departed from its earlier
holdings in this area.
112
Last term in Gardner v. Broderick'13 the Court held unconstitutional a New
York City charter provision 1 4 which required policemen to testify and waive
immunity from prosecution" 5 at grand jury inquiries into alleged misconduct
in office. Gardner refused to execute the waiver and, following an administrative
hearing, was dismissed on the grounds of employee insubordination." 6 The
108. 385 U.S. at 605.
109. See Note, Constitutional Law, 16 Am. U.L. Rev. 420, 425 (1967).
110. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. at 516 n.3.
111. Id. at 520 (concurring opinion, Fortas, J.).
112. In Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), Beilan v. Board of Educa-
tion, 357 U.S. 399 (1958), Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960), and
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958), the Court had upheld dismissals for insubordination
and the reliance by petitioners upon the privilege against self-incrimination.
113. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
114. Section 1123 of the New York City charter provides for the dismissal of city
employees who: (1) refuse to appear before "any officer, board, or body authorized to
conduct any hearing or inquiry" or (2) upon appearance before such body relies upon his
privilege against self-incrimination as the reason for not answering any question concerning
his official conduct or (3) "on account of any such matter in relation to which he may be
asked to testify."
115. Section 6, Article I of the New York Constitution provides: "No person shall be
. .. compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, providing, that any
public officer who, upon being called before a grand jury to.testify concerning the conduct of
his office or the performance of his official duties, refuses to sign a waiver of immunity
against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to answer any relevant question concerning
such matters before such grand jury, shall by virtue of such refusal, be disqualified from
holding any other public office or public employment for a period of five years, and shall
be removed from office by the appropriate authority or shall forfeit his office at the suit of
the attorney-general."
116. Since Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956), employee in-
subordination, or some variant thereof such as incompetency, doubtful trust or reliability
has been the basis for dismissal for those who refuse to answer questions relying on the
fifth amendment, in order to avoid denial of due process arguments.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Appellate Division dismissed a petition for reinstatement. 117 Appealing to the
New York Court of Appeals, Gardner urged that he had been discharged solely
for exercising his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals indi-
cated that the case was not governed by Garrity because it involved merely a
sanction of discharge from employment rather than a criminal prosecution. The
Court also distinguished Spevack on the ground that in that case a lawyer was
involved whereas in Gardner a public employee was being dismissed.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States the denial of Gardner's
petition for reinstatement was reversed. Justice Fortas rejected the distinction
made by the New York Court, and reasoned that the privilege against self-
incrimination is as available to a policeman as to an attorney. A policeman
should not have to be confronted with the choice between self-incrimination and
dismissal from his employment. However, Justice Fortas did indicate that the
privilege against self-incrimination would not be a bar to the dismissal of a pub-
lic employee who refused to answer pertinent questions without being required
to waive his immunity against prosecution.118 In other words, a witness could be
compelled to answer questions relating to the performance of his public duties
if he were protected against the use of his answers in any subsequent criminal
prosecution against him.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan read into the reasoning of the
majority a "procedural formula whereby . . . public officials may now be dis-
charged for refusing to divulge to appropriate authority information pertinent
to the faithful performance of their offices." 110 This, he felt, was a significant
limitation on what the rationale of Garrity and Spevack may have been thought
to portend.
The significance of this opinion is in the fact that Justice Fortas' opinion
did not touch upon the issue of whether lawyers could be disciplined for their
assertion of the privilege, and Justice Harlan read into the majority opinion
exactly that reasoning.
A companion case, Sanitation Men. v. Sanitation Commissioner 20 involved
employees of the Department of Sanitation of the City of New York who bad
refused to testify in administrative proceedings for the investigation of corruption
and had been discharged for failure to sign waivers of immunity. The Court held,
in an opinion written by Justice Fortas, that the employees
were entitled to remain silent because it was clear that New York was
seeking, not merely an accounting of their use or abuse of their public
117. 27 A.D.2d 800, 279 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1st Dep't. 1967).
118. 392 U.S. at 277-78. See also, Justice Fortas' statement that "The privilege may
be waived in appropriate circumstances if the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.
Answers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and
state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution
against the person testifying." Id. at 276.
119. 392 U.S. at 285 (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.).
120. 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
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trust, but testimony from their own lips which, despite the constitu-
tional prohibition, could be used to prosecute them criminally.' 2'
This seems to be in conflict with Fortas' statements in Gardner that the
privilege could be waived, or answers compelled regardless of the privilege if
their is immunity from prosecution.1
22
Although there are many problems that have not been solved by these deci-
sions, one thing is certain: the privilege against self-incrimination has been
extended and broadened whereby the scope of the privilege encompasses practi-
cally all administrative proceedings, including disbarment proceedings. Whether
this is constitutional or not can only be discerned by a critical analysis of the
development making the privilege applicable in such proceedings.
IV. SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE
The privilege against self-incrimination is one of the most exalted of the
constitutional protections. 23 The courts have accorded it a liberal construc-
tion,1 24 and have indicated that the scope of the privilege is "as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard."'12 5 The constitutional protection of a
witness against self-incrimination applies in civil as well as criminal proceed-
ings. 2 6 Recently, the Supreme Court extended the privilege to adversary pro-
ceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. 27
The constitutional privilege is intended to protect the individual from
compulsory testimony against himself. This protection encompasses extorted
confessions, as well as compelling testimony in examinations during court pro-
ceedings.'
28
The constitutional protection against self-incrimination is purely a personal
one,' 2 9 and was never meant to apply to corporations, partnerships, labor unions
or other organizations. 3 0 It was also never intended that a witness would be
121. Id. at 284.
122. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
123. See Note, Immunity Statittes and the Constitution, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 959, 961
(1968).
124. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
125. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966). "Those who framed our
Constitution and Bill of Rights were ever aware of subtle encroachments of individual
liberty . ..The privilege was elevated to constitutional status and has always been 'as
broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.'"
126. See Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920).
127. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). "It is also cear that the availability of the
privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but
upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. The
privilege may, for example, be claimed in a civil, or administrative proceeding, if the state-
ment is or may be inculpatory." 387 U.S. at 49.
128. See 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses Sec. 36-56.
129. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911); Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923).
130. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). See also George Campbell
Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1968) where the Court followed the rationale that
the privilege is personal. See, however, the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas where he
states: "I fail to see how any penalty---direct or collateral---can be imposed on anyone for
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allowed to plead the fact that some third party might be incriminated by tes-
timony, even though such witness was an agent of that person.
1 3
1
Generally the witness must explicitly claim his constitutional privilege or
he will be considered to have waived it. 3 2 The courts have taken special care
to ensure that the privilege is not violated or undermined. The result is that a
mere assertion of the privilege generally brings it into effect. It is, however, es-
sential to the existence of the right to refuse to testify that the danger be real
and appreciable, not of an imaginary or unsubstantial character. The rule was
enunciated in Mason v. United States, 33 where the court held that a witness
cannot refrain from answering merely on his personal assertion and that "[t]he
constitutional protection against self-incrimination 'is confined to real danger
and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law.' W34
The general rule is that it is for the court to decide whether the witness's
fear of incrimination is well founded. The classic statement of these rules was
made by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr:1B
When two principles come in conflict with each other, the court must
give them both a reasonable construction, so as to preserve them both
to a reasonable extent. The principle which entitles the United States
to the testimony of every citizen, and the principle by which every wit-
ness is privileged not to accuse himself, can neither of them be entirely
disregarded....
When a question is propounded, it belongs to the court to con-
sider and to decide whether any direct answer to it can implicate the
witness. If this be decided in the negative, then he may answer it with-
out violating the privilege which is secured to him by law. If a direct
answer to it may criminate himself, then he must be the sole judge
what his answer would be. The court cannot participate with him in
this judgment, because they cannot decide on the effect of his answer
without knowing what it would be; and a disclosure of that fact to the
judges would strip him of the privilege which the law allows, and which
he claims. It follows necessarily then.., that if the question be of such
a description that an answer to it may or may not criminate the wit-
ness, according to the purport of that answer, it must rest with himself,
who alone can tell what it would be, to answer the question or not. If,
in such a case, he say upon his oath that his answer would criminate
himself, the court can demand no other testimony of the fact. 8 0
invoking a constitutional guarantee. A corporation, to be sure, is not a beneficiary of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, in the sense that it may invoke it . . . .Yet placing this family
corporation on the blacklist and disqualifying it from doing business with the State of
New York is one way of reaching the economic interest of the recalcitrant president. If, as I
felt in Spevack v. Klein, ...placing the penalty of disbarment on a lawyer for invoking
the Self-Incrimination Clause is unconstitutional, so is placing a monetary penalty on a
businessman for doing the same." 392 U.S. at 290-91.
131. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
132. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
133. 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
134. Id. at 365.
135. 25 Fed. Cas. 38 (1807 CC Va.) F. Cas. No. 14692e.
136. Found in Annotation, 95 L. Ed. 1126, 1127-28 (1951).
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Since the privilege may be applicable in many different types of proceed-
ings 3 7 and the problems that may develop out of each hearing are unique, the
witness has the burden of establishing that the questions asked of him will lead
to evidence that will result in criminal prosecution. However he need not conclu-
sively prove that the answer would have such effect. The Supreme Court in
Hoffman v. United States, 3 8 asserted this, reasoning that
-.. if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove
the hazard in the sense which a claim is usually required to be estab-
lished in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection
which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege,
it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question
or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.
13 9
The modem trend seems to permit the witness to claim his privilege upon
a slight showing of the possiblity of future prosecution. The witness is not re-
quired to conclusively demonstrate that his answer would result in his subse-
quent conviction of a crime, nor must he disclose the exact nature of the hazard
feared. 140
However, when the witness voluntarily testifies, the rule applicable in
criminal cases that an individual's testimony and credibility may be impeached,
comes into operation. The breadth of his privilege is determined by the relevant
cross-examination which is permissible. Likewise, in situations involving admin-
istrative hearings, this rule prevents a defendant from presenting to the jury or
hearing board all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open
to cross-examination upon these facts.
A critical issue in this situation is whether a witness who discloses a fact or
transaction, without invoking his privilege, thereby waives his privilege with re-
spect to other details and particulars which may incriminate him as to that
which he has disclosed. In an early decision, Brown v. Walker,1 4 1 the Supreme
Court was of the opinion that the witness may waive his privilege and disclose
information. However, if he does so, he must make a full disclosure. 142 The rule
was more clearly expressed in Rogers v. United States, 43 where a witness
testified that she had been in possession of certain books and records of the
137. See Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 541 (1956)
where the writer lists seven various proceedings to which the privilege may be applicable.
They include: (1) The Legislative Investigating Committee; (2) The Third Degree; (3)
Preliminary Hearings; (4) Grand Jury Proceedings; (5) Trial-Accused; (6) Trial-Witness
Testifying; (7) Trial Criminal or Civil-Witness Testifying.
138. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
139. Id. at 486-87.
140. See In Re Hitson, 177 F. Supp. 834, at 840 (N.D. Cal. 1959), rev'd on other
grounds 283 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1960).
141. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
142. Id. at 597.
143. 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
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Communist Party. The witness refused to disclose the name of the person to
whom she gave the records, relying upon her fifth amendment protection. The
Court held, on the authority of an early Michigan Supreme Court case, that
Where a witness has voluntarily answered as to materially criminating
facts, . . . he cannot then stop short and refuse further explanation,
but must disclose fully what he has attempted to relate.
144
A significant dissent was registered by Justice Black in Rogers wherein he
attacked the majority opinion for their erroneous reliance on the waiver doc-
trine.145 Black also pointed out the dilemma with which the prospective witness
is faced in this type of situation stating that
• . . today's holding creates this dilemma for witnesses: On the one
hand, they risk imprisonment for contempt by asserting the privilege
prematurely; on the other, they might lose the privilege if they answer
a single question. The Court's view makes the protection depend on
timing so refined that lawyers, let alone laymen, will have difficulty in
knowing when to claim it.
146
The law with respect to answering revelant inquiries seems to have been
settled in Brown v. United States.147 In a denaturalization proceeding against
the petitioner, the Government contended that the petitioner had engaged in
Communist activities for over ten years and that she did not believe in the prin-
ciples of the Constitution. The petitioner voluntarily testified in her own behalf
but on cross-examination, when asked whether she was then presently a member
of the Party she refused to answer, invoking the privilege against self-incrimina-
144. Id. at 373-74. The Michigan decision from which the text was taken was
Foster v. People, 18 ich. 266 (1869). Wigmore's Treatise on Evidence (1940) Sec. 2276
summarizes the law as follows: "The case of the ordinary witness can hardly present any
doubt. He may waive his privilege; this is conceded. He waives it by exercising his option
of answering; this is conceded. Thus the only inquiry can be whether, by answering as to
fact X, he has waived it for fact Y. If the two are related facts, parts of a whole fact
forming a single relevant topic, then his waiver as to a part is a waiver as to the remaining
parts; because the privilege exists for the sake of the criminating fact as a whole. (Emphasis
in original.)" 340 U.S. at 374 n.16.
145. 340 U.S. 367, at 376 (dissenting opinion, Black, J.).
146. Id. at 378. Black alluded to the practical difficulties inherent in the rule an-
nounced by the majority opinion in Rogers and cited in United States v. St. Pierre, 132
F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942) as his authority. There the district court also relied on Foster v.
People, 18 Mich. 266 (1869), and stated: "The result of using this, like any other privilege,
is to deprive people of evidence which would otherwise be available; at best a disastrous
necessity, for disputes ought to be settled so far as they can be by resort to the whole
truth . . . surely we should not resort to so unnecessary and deplorable an innovation."
132 F.2d at 840. Compare Judge Frank's dissenting opinion in the same case where he
declares: "It is well settled . . . that a witness may properly refuse to answer a question on
the ground that the answer will incriminate him, even though the question on its face is
harmless, ... a witness may, therefore, at the beginning of a series of dangerous questions,
perceiving where they may lead, assert the privilege. If, however, he fails to do so early
in the course of questioning and, although he might then have objected, answers some
questions which may have a tendency to incriminate him, those answers do not deprive him
of the privilege of later refusing to answer further questions which more clearly put him in
danger of punishment." 132 F.2d at 843-44, dissenting opinion, Frank, J.
147. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
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tion. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed her contempt conviction.
Justice Frankfurter pointed out the difficulty facing a witness when he appears
to testify, but commented that a witness who voluntarily testifies in his own
behalf, should not be permitted to escape cross-examination by claiming his
fifth amendment privilege. To allow this would, on occasion, put before the
trier of fact a one-sided account of the disputed facts, without the reliability
of the witness having been tested.
The witness's privilege against self-incrimination is amply protected when
he testifies voluntarily, even when subject to cross-examination, since it is he who
determines the area of disclosure, and therefore the scope of inquiry on cross-
examination. The witness has the choice not to testify at all. Justice Frank-
furter concluded that the witness "cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth
Amendment gives him not only this choice, but if he elects to testify, an immu-
nity from cross-examination on the matters he has himself put in dispute.1148
Justice Black for a critical minority argued that the rules regarding waiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination applicable in criminal proceedings could
not be extended to civil proceedings "absent the most compelling justification,"
and that to do so erodes the constitutional privilege. 49
Justice Brennan also filed a dissenting opinion in Brown indicating that
the district court did not have the untrammeled discretion to punish for con-
tempt. He defended the petitioner's action and added that
her resort to her Fifth Amendment rights manifestly had substantial
merit, for the majority does not say that the Amendment's protection
against being required to give incriminating answers did not apply to
the questions, but only that she waived the protection of the Amend-
ment in the circumstances.
50
Inherent in all these situations is the proposition that the privilege can be
waived. Whether the problem of waiver as decided in Garrity may change the
strategy of the witnesses and hearing committees during disbarment proceedings
cannot yet be accurately determined. The following section on the concept of
waiver and immunity statutes will assist in presenting a useful characterization.
V. IMMUNITY STATUTES AND TrE PROBLEM OF WAIVER
Although the privilege against self-incrimination serves as a bulwark
against government coercion of a defendant in criminal cases, it oftentimes
restricts the effective information gathering power which is necessary to an
ordered society. Congress and state legislatures, in order to avoid the inhibitive
effect of the privilege have promulgated numerous statutory grants of immunity
which allow governmental agencies to question witnesses and require them to
148. Id. at 155-56.
149. Id. at 158-59 (dissenting opinion, Black, J.).
150. Id. at 164 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.).
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testify in exchange for their immunization from criminal liability for any crime
disclosed in their testimony.151
The early immunity statutes 52 were enacted to extend immunity to wit-
nesses before congressional committees. In 1868, an immunity statute was passed
that extended this right to testimony given in any judicial proceeding in federal
courts. 53 The early decisions involving these statutes permitted the introduction
of compelled testimony.
In Counselman v. Hitchcock,'" the United States Supreme Court held that
the validity of immunity statutes was dependent upon complete prosecutorial
dispensation. The case arose under a federal immunity statute which prohibited
the use of compelled testimony in any susequent federal criminal proceeding
against the witness. 5 5 The petitioner in Counselman was promised immunity but
he refused to answer questions relating to violations of the Interstate Commerce
Act. The petitioner was held in contempt of court and taken into custody for
his refusal to answer pertinent questions. On appeal from the denial of a writ
of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that since compelled testimony could
provide leads to evidence that might be incriminating in a criminal trial there
was a violation of the fifth amendment. In order for the immunity statute to
pass constitutional muster the Court held that it ". . . must afford absolute
immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question
relates."' 56
In holding that the federal immunity statute did not provide adequate pro-
tection as embodied within the fifth amendment the Court declared:
No statute which leaves the . . . witness subject to prosecution after
he answers the incriminating question put to him, can have the effect of
supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United
States . . .[T]he protection of Sec. 860 is not coextensive with the
constitutional provision. Legislation cannot detract from the privilege
afforded by the Constitution.
157
State laws making the constitutional privilege and immunity statutes
5 8
151. For a complete list of the State Immunity Laws see 8 Wigmore, Sec. 2281 and
for the Federal Immunity Statutes, see Comment, 72 Yale LJ. 1568, 1611 (1963). For an
excellent discussion of the impact of these statutes see Note, State Immunity Statutes in
Constitutional Prospective, 1968 Duke LJ. 310 (1968).
152. See Note, Immunity Statutes and the Constitution, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 959, 960-61
(1968).
153. Id. at 960 n.15.
154. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
155. Rev. Stat. Sec. 860 provided as follows: "No pleading of a party, nor any dis-
covery or evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding ....
shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him ... , in any Court of the
United States in any criminal proceeding, or for the enforcement of any penalty or for-
feiture...."
156. 142 U.S. at 586.
157. Id. at 565.
158. Three Supreme Court decisions, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (fifth
amendment not applicable to the states); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931)
(fifth amendment does not require federal immunity statute to grant immunity from state
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coextensive were not disturbed until 1964 when the Supreme Court decided
Malloy v. Hogan.159 There the Court held that the due process clause incor-
porated the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination, thereby
applying it to the states. 60 This created a nearly absolute scope of protection
for the prospective witness.' 6 '
Most jurisdictions' 62 do not provide and do not have the authority to
provide immunity to an attorney testifying at disbarment proceedings. Since
the privilege has been made applicable to disbarment proceedings by way of
Spevack and the rationale of waiver is applicable in those situations wherein
the attorney voluntarily testifies, it can be readily discerned that Spevack will
present difficulties in determining the extent of questioning which will be per-
mitted on the part of disbarment committee and which procedures they will
adopt.
VI. DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS-DuE PROCESS AND
TME FiFTr AMENDMENT
As noted heretofore, it is wholly incident to the power of the judiciary to
maintain high standards of professional conduct.' 63 Although many varying
methods of procedure are used in the various jurisdictions'6 4 it is universally
acknowledged that any attorney should be given fair notice of the charges as
well as a full and fair hearing. The importance of procedural due process was
succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Jackson when he said:
Procedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due process
of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly requires. Procedural
due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive due
process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and
defers much less to legislative judgment .... Procedural fairness and
regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substan-
tive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied. 65
At the outset it is important to classify disbarment proceedings. The pro-
ceeding is generally regarded as civil in nature, 66 despite the fact that a few
prosecution); and Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) (testimony introduced
under state immunity statutes allowed in federal court) all preceded the Malloy case.
159. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
160. Id. at 3.
161. See Donnid, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Pre-Trial Dis-
covery: The Use of Protective Orders to Avoid Constitutional Issues, 3 U.S.FL. Rev. 12,
27 (1968).
162. For a list of all the state disbarment procedures and an outline of the method
used, see Potts, Disbarment Procedure, 24 Texas L. Rev. 161, 179-89 (1945).
163. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
164. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
165. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (dissenting
opinion, Jackson, J.).
166. Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); In Re Kohler, 240 App. Div. 501, 270
N.Y.S. 634 (1934); Houtchens v. State, 63 S.W.2d 1011, reversing 47 S.W.2d 679 (1932)
(Tex. Com. App. 1933); Braverman v. Bar Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473 (1956); In
Re Speiser, 294 S.W.2d 656 (Mo., 1956); In Re Foley, 364 S.W.2d 1 (Mo., 1963); In Re
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courts have made reference to the punitive character of these proceedings and
have classified them as criminal proceedings.167 The Supreme Court of the United
States has recently intimated that such proceedings are of a quasi-criminal
nature.168 This classification is important since it determines and influences the
quantum of evidence required to disbar an attorney and affects the investigatory
procedures employed by disbarment committees. An early Massachusetts Court
made the following observation with respect to disbarment procedures:
At common law an attorney was always liable to be dealt with in a
summary way for ill practice attended with fraud or corruption, and
committed against the obvious rules of justice and honesty. No com-
plaint, indictment or information was ever necessary as the foundation
of such proceedings.
69
Most assuredly our system has come a long way from that harsh standard.
However, the rules promulgated by each state legislature or judiciary have now
been left impotent by virtue of the rationale in Spevack. Facts which are pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of the disciplined attorney may be concealed by his
mere reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus a disbarment
committee must develop its case through independent sources, making the task
of the agency given such authority that much more difficult. 170 This is no argu-
ment for the abolition of the fifth amendment protection as applied to attorneys
in disbarment proceedings; merely a warning to those who look beyond the need
for an unsullied bar and perhaps overemphasize the rigors of due process.
Courts have generally called the practice of law a "privilege" rather than a
"right."'171 The former term has been used to justify the exclusion of those
members of the bar whose behavior deviated from the norm. As one New York
tribunal declared:
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A fair
private and professional character is one of them. Compliance with
that condition is essential at the moment or admission; but it is equally
essential afterwards ... Whenever the condition is broken, the privilege
is lost.' 72
Peterson, 260 Minn. 339, 110 N.W.2d 518 (1961); Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430,
285 N.Y.S.2d 93, 231 N.E.2d 718 (1967).
167. In Re Harris, 88 N.J.L. 18, 95 A. 761 (1915); Lantz v. State Bar of California,
212 Cal. 213, 298 P. 497 (1931); In Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) speaking of disbarment
as a punishment.
168. See In Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
169. In Re Randall, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 473, 479 (1869). Found in Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Due Process of Law In State Disbarment Proceedings, 37 Notre Dame Law.
346, 347 n.10 (1962).
170. For a critical look at the supervision of the New York Bar, see Schizer, The
Brooklyn Judicial Inquiry: A Record of Accomplishment, 29 Brooklyn L. Rev. 27, 42 (1962).
171. See Note, Admission to the Bar, 47 Neb. L. Rev. 128, 141 (1968). This student
casenote presents an interesting study of the influence of justice Black in the area of dis-
barment and indicates that the Supreme Court may be turning away from the view that
the practice of law is a privilege and possibly concluding that it is a "vested" right.
172. Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84-85, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917). See also People
ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
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When the state admits a person to practice and grants him a license, it is
representing to the public that this individual is worthy of its trust and confi-
dence. Thus it should not be held an invalid exercise of the state's police power
to protect the public and the profession from undesirable persons.173
The precise issue is whether the lawyer's right to remain silent under the
mantle of the fifth amendment over-rides his special responsibility to the public.
As one attorney has argued:
It is fallacious to equate the lawyer facing disbarment with a criminal
facing prosecution. A simple but more apt analogy could be drawn
between our profession and the cashier who is privileged to handle the
store's money. No responsible person would propose that a cashier who
appeared to be pocketing cash receipts and who persistently refused
on constitutional grounds to answer any questions pertaining to the
shortage should continue as a cashier. Common prudence would sug-
gest that the cashier be transferred to another position that did not
involve the handling of money. Lawyers have a constitutional right
against self-incrimination but lawyers do not have a constitutional
right to remain a lawyer. 7 4
The essential qualities of honesty, integrity and probity are imposed upon
an attorney exercising privileges and responsibilities as a member of the bar. It
has been suggested that when lack of these qualities becomes apparent in an
attorney's transactions with his clients and the public in general, it becomes the
duty of the court to remove from its roster such an undesirable member.' 75
The method used by each state whenever it purges its bar membership is
varied. Some follow what has been termed the "agency" type procedure.' 76 In
173. See Cole, Bar Discipline and Spevack v. Klein, 53 A.B.A.J. 819 (1967).
174. Id. at 820.
175. In Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 613, 214 N.W. 379, 383 (1927).
176. See Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stat. Ch. 110A, sec. 751; Ind. Burn's Stat. 1946 Repl.
Sec. 4-3618; Kent. KRS-30.190; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 221 sec. 40 et seq.; Penn Purdon's
Stat. tit. 17 sec. 1661 et seq.; Ohio Page's Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 4705.02; and N.Y.
Judiciary Law § 90 et. seq. (McKinney 1968). The New York and Ohio laws should be
compared. In both jurisdictions, the courts generally designate a fact-finding "agency"
to investigate the charges against the attorney. In Ohio the statute reads: "The supreme
court, court of appeals, or court of common pleas may suspend or remove an attorney at
law from office or may give private or public reprimand to him as the nature of the offense
may warrant, for misconduct or unprofessional conduct in office involving moral turpitude,
or for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Such suspension or removal shall
operate as a suspension or removal in all the courts of the state ... Judges of such state
courts are required to cause proceedings to be instituted against an attorney, when it
comes to the knowledge of any judge or when brought to his knowledge by the bar
association of the county in which such attorney practices that he may be guilty of any of
the causes for suspension, removal, or reprimand." (Page's Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec.
4705.02.) In New York the applicable statute reads: "The Supreme Court shall have power
and control over attorneys ...and the appellate division of the supreme court in each
department is authorized to censure, suspend from practice or remove from office any
attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to practice who is guilty of professional miscon-
duct.. ." N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(2) (McKinney 1968). With respect to the investigating
agency the statute provides that ". . . it shall be the duty of any district attorney within a
department, when so designated by the justices of the appellate division of the supreme
court ...to prosecute all proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys and
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these jurisdictions the court appoints a referee, commissioner, or other judicial
body to conduct the actual disbarment investigation. Other jurisdictions have
special grievance committees in the respective congressional or county districts
which handle these proceedings. 177 Still others permit only the court itself to
hear and decide the proper sanction. 178 A small minority of states do not follow
the agency type of hearing, but rather as in civil actions, provide for a jury to
decide the attorney's fate.179 In the ordinary disciplinary proceeding, after the
facts have been presented to the hearing committe and a prima facie case has
been made, the burden then shifts to the attorney. Attorneys generally answer
the questions posed by the committee, but many refuse to testify, asserting
their rights under the fifth amendment. Although it can be persuasively argued,
as in Spevack, that the refusal to answer questions as to professional misconduct
does not warrant disbarment, the recognition that ethical standards for the pro-
fession must be maintained vitiates such an argument. As one bar association
committee member concluded:
Ordinarily the occasion for disbarment should be the demonstration,
by a continued course of conduct, of an attitude wholly inconsistent
with the recognition of proper professional standards. Unless it is clear
that the lawyer will never be one who should be at the bar, suspension
is preferable. For isolated acts, censure, private or public, is more ap-
propriate. Only where a single offense is of so grave a nature as to be
impossible to a respectable lawyer, such as deliberate embezzlement,
bribery of a juror or court official, or the like, should suspension or
disbarment be imposed. 80
Generally, in disbarment proceedings, the ordinary rules of evidence
apply.18 If this is the established rule, it would seem that a permissible in-
ference may be raised for the failure of an attorney to answer the charges
brought aginst him. Dean Erwin Griswold has stated it most clearly:
A lawyer is hailed before [a grievance committee] on a complaint of
a client that the lawyer has embezzled the poor widow's funds, and the
lawyer says to the Grievance Committee, 'I refuse to answer any
questions on the grounds of self-incrimination.' My guess is that the
counsellors-at-law or the said justices or a majority of them may appoint any attorney or
counsellor-at-law to conduct a preliminary investigation and to prosecute any disciplinary
proceeding ... ." N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(7) (McKinney 1968).
177. In Connecticut a grievance committee is appointed. Three members from each
county who act as an independent public body charged with performance of a public duty.
The statute reads in part: "... whose duty it shall be to inquire into, investigate and
present to the court offenses not occurring in the actual presence of the court involving the
character, integrity, professional standing and conduct of members of the bar." (Gen. Stat.
of Conn. Rev. 1958, Sec. 51-90).
178. This is the case in Missouri. See Vernon's Ann. Miss. Stat. Sec. 484.240-270
(1949).
179. Arkansas and Texas are two states which provide a trial by jury in disbarment
cases. See Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec. 25-411 (1947) and Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 316 (1959).
180. Drinker, Legal Ethics, 46-47 (1953).
181. See People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Amos, 246 Ill. 229, 92 N.E. 857 (1910).
See also supra note 169 at 355.
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Grievance Committee reports that he ought to be disbarred, and if I
were on the Grievance Committee, I think I would, assuming that
there is evidence as I have said connecting him with it, and he does
not make any appropriate response.
1 8 2
The policy consideration underlying the Spevack decision is a tenuous
balance between the individual attorney's personal rights and the duties he
owes to the public. With that in mind, one must consider the impact of that
rationale.
VII. IMPACT OF THE RATIONALE OF SPEVACK V. KLEIN
Undoubtedly, the Spevack holding casts doubt on the constitutional
validity of state statutes which require the accused attorney in disbarment
proceedings to bear the burden of proving fitness. There are those who may
logically conclude that the words "incrimination" and "criminal case" have been
expanded by Spevack so that a witness may now declare: "I refuse to answer
on the ground that my answer might subject me to professsional discipline."
8 3
The practical effect of Spevack is best illustrated by these two extreme
circumstances. In situations where there is sufficient evidence of misconduct,
the attorney when questioned need only cite his privilege to avoid discipline.
On the other hand in cases where there is very little evidence, the attorney
on being questioned is the only source from whom information can be obtained
on which to base any disciplinary action. This latter situation seldom occurs
and this is the precise issue which portends trouble for state bar agencies.' 8 4
Spevack left unanswered the question as to whether disbarment proceed-
ings were civil or criminal in nature. 8 5 This was recently discussed in In Re
Ruffalo. 8 6 The latter case involved an Ohio trial lawyer who had been dis-
barred for his mishandling of Federal Employer's Liability Act cases. He was
subsequently removed from the rolls of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Court of Appeals, holding
that Ruffalo had not been accorded procedural due process. 87 The importance
182. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today, 39 Marq. L. Rev. 191, 202 (1956).
See also Schafer, The Suspect and Society, 80 (1967) and Ratner, Consequences of Exercising
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 472 (1959).
183. See Niles & Kaye, Spevack v. Klein: Milestone or Millstone in Bar Discipline?
53 A.B.A.J. 1121, 1124 (1967).
184. See Franck, The Myth of Spevack v. Klein, 54 A.BA.J. 970, 971 (1968).
185. The dissent in Spevack addressed itself to the issue of whether disbarment was a
penal or remedial sanction and concluded that it was the latter. Penal sanctions are those
generally imposed in order to punish an individual for past conduct, whereas remedial
sanctions are those imposed in order to protect a continuing substantial public interest.
For a discussion of the distinction that should be drawn between these two types of sanc-
tions see Comment, 72 Yale L.J. 1568, 1586 (1963). The author of that note urges that the
scope of penal sanctions be broadened to include all sanctions which deprive the individual
"of a right at the cost of asserting a constitutional privilege.
186. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
187. The majority held that the lack of notice to Ruffalo, prior to the time he and
another witness, one Orlando were to testify as to his misconduct denied him procedural
due process. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, relying on Theard v. United States, 354
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of the decision, however, is the dicta prevalent in Justice Douglas' opinion with
respect to the nature of disbarment proceedings wherein he stated that "Dis-
barment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on
the lawyer.1
188
Douglas added that disbarment proceedings "are adversary proceedings of
a quasi-criminal nature."'1 9 Although Ruffalo does not seem important in terms
of an impact upon basic constitutional law, it again reveals the method by
which the Court lays the foundation for future principals that ultimately become
the law. If a majority of the Court should "equate" disbarment proceedings
with a criminal case then attorneys will have the right to refuse to answer any
questions that might subject them to discipline or criminal prosecution. 100
The decision in Ruffalo and the rationale of Spevack pose the following
problems for state bar agencies: (1) Are members of disbarment committees
required to apprise the accused attorney of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion following the rules enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona?' 1' (2) If the
attorney appears voluntarily, after being apprised of his privilege, has he
effectively waived that right to remain silent? (3) If there is such a waiver
and the questioning initially is of a nature that is not incriminating but sub-
sequently begins to be of such a nature, are the "fruits" of such testimony
admissible in either criminal or disbarment proceedings? (4) What will be the
effect of immunity statutes when applied to attorneys? (5) Is the required-
records doctrine exposited in Shapiro v. United States'92 a better accomodation
between the extreme positions taken in Spevack?
U.S. 278 (1956) indicated that the federal disbarment order was adequate to afford
Ruffalo due process in the state disbarment proceedings. The majority, however, had held
that state disbarment actions are entitled to respect by the federal courts, but are not
conclusively binding upon them.
188. 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968).
189. Id. at 551.
190. This is the conclusion drawn by Franck in his article, supra note 184, and he
cites the Ruffalo case as a possible expansion into the area of "criminal cases" with respect
to disbarment procedures.
191. The rationale of Miranda is that in the absence of a suspect's intelligent waiver of
his pertinent constitutional rights, a suspect prior to any in-custody police questioning must
be warned in clear and unequivocal terms (1) that he has a right to remain silent, (2) that
any statement he does make may be used in evidence against him, (3) that he has the right
to consult with, and have present prior to and during interrogation, an attorney, either
retained or appointed, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning, if he so desires. (See Annotation-Necessity of Informing
Suspect of Rights Under Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, Prior to Police Interrogation
-10 A.L.R.3d 1054, 1060 (1966)). As a practical matter it would seem that these rules could
not be made applicable to disbarment proceedings because such proceedings do not fall
within the "in-custody" rationale of Miranda. In another context it would not seem
feasible that such warnings could be given to an attorney since he would undoubtedly be
aware of them and more than likely represent himself rather than consulting with another
attorney. In any case, the Supreme Court in making the privilege applicable and holding that
disbarment proceedings are of a "quasi-criminal nature" has not exposited any guidelines,
that should be followed, hence the reliance upon Miranda would seem to be justified.
192. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). The Shapiro case dealt with the immunity provisions of the
Emergency Price Control Act. The OPA regulations requiring merchants to keep records
did not excuse them from complying with the Act by a specific claim of the fifth amendment
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These legal questions are intriguing and remain unanswered. Regardless
of how far the privilege has been extended via Spevack, the first round of
litigation following Spevack indicates that these and many more issues may be
raised.
One of the first cases to come before the Supreme Court dealt with the
question as to whether Spevack was to be given retroactive application. In Re
Kaufman'9 3 involved an attorney who had been disbarred one year prior to
Spevack for issuing worthless checks and converting to his own use over
5,000 of his client's share of a personal injury claim. The Supreme Court
privilege. The immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 compelled
merchants to produce books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and the like if they were
subpoenaed before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court reasoned that these
records were "public" as distinguished from private papers and held that the required-
records provision did not violate the fifth amendment. Although the logic of this doctrine
would seem to violate cardinal constitutional safeguards under the fourth and fifth amend-
ments, most federal administrative agencies have not exceeded the limits of the Shapiro
rationale. Chief Justice Vinson, writing for. the majority in Shapiro did conclude "that
there are limits which the Government cannot constitutionally exceed in requiring the
keeping of records which may be inspected by an administrative agency and may be used
in prosecuting statutory violations committed by the record-keeper himself." The factual
circumstances did not disturb Vinson because "there is a sufficient relation between the
activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the Government . .. can
constitutionally require the keeping of particular records, subject to inspection by the
Administration." 335 U.S. at 32. The danger of the majority opinion in Shapiro was
noted by Justice Jackson: "The protection against compulsory self-incrimination, guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment, is nullified to whatever extent this Court holds that Congress
may require a citizen to keep an account of his deeds and misdeeds and turn over or exhibit
the record on demand of government inspectors, who then can use it to convict him
.... It would, no doubt, simplify enforcement of all criminal laws if each citizen were
required to keep a diary that would show where he was at all times, with whom he was,
and what he was up to. The decision of today, applying this rule not merely to records
specially required under the Act but also to records 'customarily kept,' invites and facilitates
that eventuality." (335 U.S. at 70-71, dissenting opinion, Jackson, J.) The inconsistency of
the Shapiro doctrine was excellently described by Professor McKay when he said: "The
doctrine is accordingly inconsistent with both major policy purposes of the privilege
previously outlined: preservation of morality in government and preservation of individual
privacy. A government that can roam at will through all records that it may demand to
inspect because it may demand that they be kept is not a government that is bound to
respect individual privacy. That Shapiro has not led, as it could have, to substantially more
is a tribute to the self-restraint of government officials than to any meaningful limits in
Shapiro." (Found in Kurland, The Supreme Court Review 1967, 193 at 217.) Although
the Supreme Court in three federal registration cases (Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85
(1968)) seemed to have discussed the required-records doctrine it side-stepped the issue in
the exercise of judicial restraint. The Court approached these cases just as it did in
Spevack. If the assertion of the privilege was "costly" it was unconstitutional. Although
the Shapiro doctrine was discussed by the other Justices in Spevack they failed to test its
applicability to disciplinary proceedings and the possible ramifications of such an application.
Most attorneys keep records that are subpoenaed in disbarment proceedings. The hearing
committee does not do this in order to skirt its burden of proof; merely that more often
than not they are the only records which are available. It would seem preferable to
expand the required-records doctrine in the area of disbarment rather than limit it. Since
attorneys handle an individual's private affairs and their money, what better way to
prevent fraud or conversion than the necessity to keep records. This is the procedure that
exists in England. (See Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945, 2 Annual Practice (1961) 3006,
and Solicitors' Trust Account Rules, 1956, id. at 3014.)
193. 25 A.D.2d 68, 266 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1967).
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denied certiorari and it thus appears that Spevack will be given only prospec-
tive application.
9 4
Two cases, arising in New York, Zuckerman v. Greason,95 and Kaye v.
Co-Ordinating Committee On Discipline,'9" came before the Court one month
after Spevack. In Zuckerman, the petitioner and another attorney had sub-
mitted misleading, exaggerated, and false medical bills and statements and
had refused to cooperate with the court in an effort to expose such unethical
practices and to determine whether the attorneys were guilty of professional
misconduct. The attorneys refused to produce certain documents, claiming their
privilege against self-incrimination. On remand from the Supreme Court of the
United States the New York Appellate Division entered an order suspending
Zuckerman for five years. 19 7 The Court of Appeals affirmed, and declared that
an attorney could be disbarred or suspended for invoking the faith amendment
in a disciplinary proceeding, since the constitutional privilege did not justify
withholding evidence which could not lead to criminal prosecution but which
bore only upon an attorney's right to continue the practice of law.198 Judge
Van Voorhis stated:
These men have made the disclosures which have contributed to the
disciplinary measures which have been imposed upon them. They
are not charged with crime . . . We do not suggest that the witness
is protected by the Constitution only when testifying in criminal
courts. The law is settled to the contrary. But to bring him within the
protection of the Constitution, the disclosure asked of him must
expose him to punishment for crime . . . The evidence which these
appellants produced before the Referee cannot be used against them
in any criminal proceeding. The constitutional privilege applies only
in the case of evidence which might be used against them in a crimi-
nal case under the language of the Fifth Amendment. Haber and
Zuckerman may have thought that unless they produced this evidence
that they would be disbarred under Cohen v. Hurley, but neither
Garrity nor Spevack confers upon them a constitutional privilege to
withhold evidence which cannot lead to criminal prosecution and bears
only upon their right to continue to practice law.199
The attorney's petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari was denied.
2 0 0
This interpretation of the Spevack case seems to reject the idea that disbar-
ment is a "penalty" and stresses the fact that only if the "fruits" of the testi-
194. 389 U.S. 1048 (1967).
195. 23 A.D.2d 825, 259 N.Y.S.2d 963, reversed and remanded 386 U.S. 15 (1967).
196. 24 A.D.2d 345, 266 N.Y.S.2d 69, reversed and remanded 386 U.S. 17 (1967).
197. 28 A.D.2d 907 (2d Dept. 1967.) In the first decision, Haber and another attorney
had been suspended for five years and Zuckerman disbarred. On remand both attorneys
received five year suspensions.
198. 20 N.Y.2d 430, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1, 231 NE.2d 718 (1967).
199. Id. at 433, 231 N.E.2d 721.
200. 390 U.S. 925 (1968).
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mony are to be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution is such a disbarment
unconstitutional.
20 '
In the Kaye case, involving disciplinary proceedings of an attorney who
had "farmed out" negligence cases without regard to the services and responsi-
bilities he owed to his clients, the Appellate Division examined Kaye's past
disciplinary record and concluded that disbarment was fully justified.20 2 The
Supreme Court, as in Zuckerman, denied certiorari in the Kaye case.20 3
A number of cases also presented the issue as to whether an immunity
statute would preclude disbarment. The first case, In Re Ungar,2°4 developed
out of a contempt conviction sustained by Ungar, arising as a result of his
conduct at a criminal trial involving governmental officials who had violated a
conflict of interest statute.20 5 He was disbarred for aiding and abetting those
officials in violation of the statute and the attempted obstruction of justice.
He appealed to the United States Supreme Court, one week prior to Spevack
and review was denied.20 6 After Spevack was decided Ungar then filed a
motion with the Appellate Division to vacate the order on the grounds that the
testimony given before the grand jury investigating the alleged corruption had
been compelled by a grant of immunity. Ungar argued that the criminal
charges could not be the basis for disbarment. The court denied his motion on the
grounds that the fifth amendment proscribes compelled testimony only in a
criminal case, and a disciplinary proceeding is not of a criminal nature.2 0 7
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, certiorari was denied.2 0 8
Another New York case, In Re Klebanoff,209 dealt with an attorney who
employed another lawyer who had been previously disbarred and who had also
been guilty of professional misconduct in his failure to comply with the court
rules and his submission of false bills of particulars. He was disbarred as a
result of information given by him before a grand jury investigating the
alleged misconduct. He appealed to the New York Court of Appeals arguing
that he had not received immunity as a result of his coming before the grand
jury and testifying, and that it was a violation of due process for the disbarment
committee to use the compelled testimony against him in a subsequent disbar-
201. This is the point that Justice Fortas seems to be making in Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273 (1968).
202. 29 A.D.2d 20, 284 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1st Dept., 1967). The court checked Kaye's past
disciplinary record which included the defrauding of insurance companies, 222 App. Div.
829, 226 N.Y.S. 391 (2nd Dept., 1928), and issuing bad checks for which he was suspended,
281 App. Div. 508, 120 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1st Dept., 1953). Seven years after the first disbar-
ment he received a presidential pardon, 243 App. Div. 615, 277 N.Y.S. 636 (2nd Dept., 1935)
and a reinstatement after the 1953 suspension, and concluded that his disbarment should not
be reduced to a suspension.
203. - U.S. -.
204. 25 A.D.2d 322, 269 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1st Dept., 1966).
205. See Franck, supra note 184, at 971-72.
206. 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
207. 27 A.D.2d 925, 282 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1st Dept. 1967), affd 18 N.Y.S.2d 690.
208. 389 U.S. 1007 (1967).
209. 21 N.Y.2d 920, 289 N.Y.S.2d 755, 237 N.E.2d 75, (1968).
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3nent proceeding. The New York Court rejected his theory on the authority
•Zuckerman, and the Supreme Court as it had done in the other cases arising
in New York, denied certiorari.210
One of the cases most clearly demonstrating the problems created as a
result of Spevack is Curry v. Florida Bar.211 An attorney in Florida was sus-
pended for six months for solicitation of business. The attorney appeared before
the grievance committee as required by the Florida Bar's Integration Rules and
testified without invoking his privilege. The attorney argued that immunity
had been conferred upon him by virtue of his appearance before the committee.
The Florida Supreme Court rejected his contention, held:
In this proceeding we have no statutory immunity where he is called
to testify .... At no time during this proceeding did Mr. Curry refuse
to testify or otherwise claim his constitutional right against self-
incrimination
2 12
Review is pending before the Supreme Court and it remains to be seen
whether Spevack and Ruffalo will be further extended.2 18 The Court has de-
nied review on five214 disbarment and disciplinary cases and two other cases in-
volving collateral issues are still awaiting disposition.
21 5
From the recent trend it would seem that the Court is not inclined to
depart from the Spevack rationale. Whether the court changes its position will
depend on the number of factors, many of them so complex that recital would
be of no avail. An interesting possibility is a change in the composition of the
Court if and when Chief Justice Earl Warren carries out his intended and
publicly announced retirement.2 16 Just as in Spevack, where the composition
210. - U.S. - (1969).
211. 211 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1968).
212. Id. at 172.
213. Cert. denied - U.S. - (1969). There are two questions presented to the Supreme
Court in Curry. One of them deals with the first amendment privilege and the state's use
in disciplinary proceedings leading to disbarment or suspension of evidence via the threat
of contempt of court. The other is most intriguing and involves the reapportionment of the
Board of Governors of the Florida Bar. See In Re the Florida Bar, 175 So. 2d 530 (Fla.
1965). The actual question presented is: "Was attorney denied equal protection of laws by
his suspension upon recommendation of Florida Bar Association Board of Governors, whose
membership is geographically determined, but that grossly violates 'one-man-one-vote' rule?"
214. Epling v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 15 Ohio St. 2d 23, 238 N.E.2d 558 (1968), cert.
denied (issuing bad checks-record did not support prejudice on part of grievance committee);
Hart v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 15 Ohio St. 2d 97, 238 N.E.2d 560 (1968), cert. denied, no. 419,
37 L.W. 3174 (1968) (failure to file income tax return warranted suspension); Jacobs v.
Toledo Bar Ass'n, 13 Ohio St. 2d 147, 235 NYE.2d 230 (1968), cert. denied, no. 327, 37 L.W.
3134 (1968) (co-mingling of funds); Winn v. Florida Bar, 208 So. 2d 809 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1968), cert. denied, no. 338, 37 L.W. 3151 (1968) (charging illegal and extortionate fees);
and Sglarto v. Klein, 27 A.D.2d 738, 277 N.Y.S.2d 318, 22 N.Y.2d 813 (2d Dept., 1967),
cert. denied no. 510, 37 L.W. 3165 (1968) (professional misconduct).
215. Preston v. Wisconsin, 38 Wis. 2d 582, 157 N.,V.2d 615 (1968), cert. denied -
U.S. - 89 S. Ct. 452 (1969) (equal protection and due process violated by referee's finding
of unprofessional conduct resulting in disbarment based on "preponderance" rather than
"clear" weight of evidence). Also In Re Shavin, 239 N.E.2d 790 (III. Sup. Ct. 1968) (filing
of fraudulent income tax return sufficient to warrant disciplinary action).
216. See New York Times, June 23, 1968, Sec. 4, p. E3.
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of the Court needed only one individual to reverse the trend of the law, perhaps
this will be the case after the retirement of the Chief Justice.
217
A number of problems still remain to be answered. The most important
of these is whether the distinction between public employees and attorneys
posed by Mr. Justice Fortas will be broadened,218 whereby the state will be
permitted to ask questions of attorneys over their invocation of the fifth
amendment.
Another question which most certainly will have to be examined is
whether a bar applicant will be permitted to claim his privilege and refuse to
answer questions put to him when Character and Fitness Committees conduct
their preliminary examinations. 219 Since the Court intimated that there was
no difference between disbarment and admission cases in Spevack 220 this very
well may present the court with a vehicle to enunciate standards that will
balance the competing values in this area.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This study was designed to show that there are no conclusive answers re-
garding disbarment proceedings and the privilege against self-incrimination. It
was presented in a historical context to show how the privilege has developed
almost to the point where it is absolute in scope and application. The public
outcry has not yet reached the level where the Court will reverse itself com-
217. (Cohen) (Spevack)
Majority Minority Majority Minority
Harlan Black Black Harlan
Clark Brennan Brennan Clark
Frankfurter Douglas Douglas Stewart
Stewart Warren Warren White
Whittaker Fortas (concurring)
From the Spevack Court the only Justice who is not now presently upon the Bench is
Justice Clark who was replaced by Justice Thurgood Marshall. Although he has voted with
the liberal majority on most occasions, his concurring opinion in Ruffalo would seem to indi-
cate that he might be persuaded to vote with the minority if the factual circumstances of a
particular case coincide with his views in Ruffalo. Although this is mere speculation the
appointment of Warren Burger to replace Earl Warren and the seat left open by the resig-
nation of Abe Fortas presents a possibility of a return to the Cohen rationale.
218. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
219. The practical problems that such a rule would create are voluminous at best. An
applicant could presumably enter the profession even though he had been convicted of a
crime. Although "penal" sanctions once they have been served should not reflect upon the
"present" character of a witness, it would be in the best interests of a state to have some
knowledge of the applicant's background before certifying him. Since most applicants must
show proof of good moral character it is assumed that documentary evidence such as police
records and the like should be made available to the investigating committee. If the applicant
rested his refusal in not submitting the required documents or material upon fifth amendment
grounds, it would seem reasonable to place the burden upon him to show why they should
be excluded.
220. "Identical principles have been applied by this Court to applicants for admission
to the bar who have refused to produce information pertinent to their professional and moral
qualifications." 385 U.S. at 528.
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pletely. However, rumblings have been heard in certain parts of our system,
most specifically the legislature.221 If the legislatilres begin passing laws which
will affect the judicial authority in the area of admissions or disbarments,
one can only speculate as to what crises or problems may develop. Most as-
suredly the state cannot be left powerless in protecting its citizens. Therefore it
should be recognized that attorneys must conform to at least minimum stan-
dards of ethical conduct. As judge Cardozo once declared: "We will not
declare, unless driven to it by sheer necessity, that a confessed criminal has
been intrenched by the very confession of his guilt beyond the power of re-
moval [from the Bar] "222
Thus it is incumbent upon the judiciary with the assistance of the re-
spective state bar associations, and under the leadership of the American Bar
Association to draft model rules which when adopted will cast a respectful
mantle of light upon the entire profession. Attorneys should neither be given
preferential treatment nor should they be recognized as "second class" citizens.
The problem is a sensitive one, involving morality and a balance of govern-
mental power. Unless the organized bench and bar is able to meet the challenge
and clean up its "own house" the state of the profession will remain in ill
repute. Again in the words of Cardozo, " [i] f the house is to be cleaned, it is
for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to do the
noisome work.1
223
The work is burdensome but meaningful if a proper formulation can be
found to ensure that lawyers adhere to their professional responsibilities. Even
though a highly ethical profession can only come as a result of individual
morality, its effectiveness can be advanced by a total commitment by the bar.
The challenge, a matter of social importance, is there to be met and must be
met if the legal profession is to enhance its image.
221. See Detroit News, December 8, 1968, p. 3, where one state legislator intimated
that he would present a bill to the Michigan legislature to abolish the integrated bar system
unless progress could be made in the area of disciplining attorneys who were guilty of un-
professional conduct. His theory would reject the system of examinations and set up a licens-
ing board as exists for dentists, and other professions.
222. Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 85, 116 N.E. 782 (1917).
223. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 480, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
